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Introduction
A standard introduction to economics will reveal that the hallmark of an 
economy is that it contains producers and consumers. Producers create products that 
are to be exchanged either with other producers or with consumers. If exchanged with a 
consumer, then the good produced is termed as a ‘consumer good’ and is subsequently 
‘consumed’ when it is put to use. Essentially, this rough theoretical understanding of a 
consumer good reveals that consumer goods travel directly from the hands of the 
producer to the mouth of the consumer and are not employed in the production of 
another good. Certainly, this definition does gives us a great deal to work with in our 
understanding of consumer goods, and economists would maintain that it captures the 
essence of consumer goods. However, it does not give an account of consumer goods as 
they exist for us in everyday circumstance. The ontology given by economists in their 
treatment of consumer goods is not thick enough. How do we perceive consumer 
goods? What do they mean to us? How is our interaction with consumer goods 
historically contingent? This essay will be an exercise in expounding this definition and 
broadening our ontology of consumer goods.
In order to uncover these missing elements, we can consult the philosophical 
method of phenomenology. Phenomenology is sufficient because it is a key tool in 
unlocking the meaning behind everyday living. (Zahavi 2019: 9). Essentially, its 
methodology of revealing hidden ontological structures begins with taking note of what 
in our horizon of experience is meaningfully significant, via tracing our intentionality, 
and then revealing why it is significant through rooting it to an ontological structure
(Husserl 1936: 142). Phenomenological theorists, taking que from Kant, understand that 
this fundamental ontological structure is in fact the frame through which we perceive 
what is meaningfully significant (Loidolt 2017: 111). And so, meaning, for at least 
Heidegger and Arendt – the two phenomenologists we shall focus on, is only possible
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because of ontological structures. In the case of Arendt, these ontological structures are
not constant in the sense that they form the essence of the human condition, but rather
they change via transformations in the environment presented before us (Arendt 1958:
10). Phenomenology understands that our reality is constituted by a shifting landscape
of ontological structures that consistently morph and change the way in which we see
things as meaningful. The advantage of understanding the landscape that is present in
our relationship with consumer goods is that we get an appreciation of the nuance and
complexity behind an individual’s consumer experience. Furthermore, we also
understand how our relationship with consumer goods is historically contingent via
understanding the dynamism of hidden ontological structures. In short,
phenomenology is necessary to get at the depth behind everyday interaction with
consumer goods, and it stands in significant contrast to how consumer goods are
understood from the third-person, detached perspective of economists.
Dealing with consumer goods
Let us first reflect upon our everyday relationship with consumer goods. Initially,
this comes across as a daunting task for how could we possibly come up with an
understanding of experiences from riding a bicycle to eating sushi? However, common
to all of these varied experiences is the notion that consumer goods are there to
accommodate a purpose. These are objects of experience that serve as means to an end.
For example: clothing might be ‘consumed’ to appear fashionable, and for some,
clothing is seen to be of value due to how wearing it represents participation in a
fashionable trend. From this example, we get the idea that consumer goods carry
meaning due to how they can be bent towards a purpose. When we are looking at a
shelf at a grocery store only the goods that carry some meaning for us are highlighted.
Our eyes seem to glaze over the ones that don’t have any relevance to us. To flesh out
this notion that our interaction with consumer goods is one that is always pointed to a
particular end, let’s introduce some terminology from Heidegger.
For Heidegger (1927: 97), entities that are employed to serve an end are called
equipment, and within the perception of these entities is a whole totality of referential
equipment. The making use of equipment is called dealing with equipment (Heidegger
1927: 95). In the dealing of these entities, our gaze is pointed to a specific end or
separate set of equipment that would achieve that end. In Heideggerian terms, the end
is called the assignment and the separate equipment complementary to completing the
assignment is called the reference (Heidegger 1927: 97). So, for example, when buying
clothes, your mind might be directed towards the price tag. Which would then be
directed to the cash in your wallet. Which would then be directed to the cashier where
we pay for the clothes (if the price is lower than the amount of cash in your wallet).
What we encounter in this example is the notion of the totality of equipment that
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brightens up, demands our attention, and precedes reaching our end (Heidegger 1927:
97). The cashier, your wallet, the price tag, these are all separate equipment that is
necessarily used to consume clothes. This is only so because our attention is not
primarily concerned with consumer good itself, it is primarily concerned with the end
to which the consumer good can be put to use to, the assignment of the consumer good;
hence there may be a totality of referential equipment the consumer good points to in
order for us to complete the assignment. So, generally speaking, in dealing with a
consumer good, we are aware of and make use of several other equipment.
Further, when we do deal with consumer goods, we are situated as a
being-in-the-world that can either immerse itself in dealing or can deliberate before
dealing. Being-in-the-world is what Heidegger calls our subjective existential state of
being (Heidegger 1927: 78). If being-in-the-world, namely the subject, immerses itself in
the completion of the assignment of equipment, then the equipment appears
ready-to-hand and we immediately proceed to make use of it (Heidegger 1927: 98).
Moreover, if the equipment is ready-to-hand then we do not deliberate before dealing
with it (Heidegger 1927: 98). In the context of consumer goods, if the consumer good
appears as ready-to-hand then we proceed to consume without any theoretical
consideration of the consumer good. It is important to note that, an explication of
consumer goods as ready-to-hand is exactly the purpose of a phenomenology of
consumer goods. For if we are to deliberate before its consumption then the ontological
structures that showcase why the consumer good is meaningful remain hidden. This
point can be further emphasized by understanding that the knowledge of that which is
ready-to-hand is already known to us. The reason why it is already known is because
we make use of it so immediately. What we are not consciously aware of is not the
‘know-how’ of the consumer good, but instead the reason why it is so. Why is its
consumption so immediately obvious to our being? The reasons why are exactly the
ontological structures that lie underneath our perception of consumer goods. Hence,
only in dealing with consumer goods that are ready-to-hand can we reveal what is
ontologically meaningful. On the other hand, if we are to depart from viewing
equipment as ready-to-hand, then equipment appears as present-at-hand. Seeing
entities as present-at-hand is to hesitate and deliberate before making use of an object in
your horizon of experience (Heidegger 1927: 101). Accompanied with a methodology of
understanding a present-at-hand entity is an attempt to fit the entity in a theory. In the
context of consumer goods, this is the attempt made by economists. Although as we
have seen, the economist approach to consumer goods lacks an appreciation of the
meaning that consumer goods carry for humans in their everyday living. In other
words, the present-at-hand entity exists ontically without the support of any
meaningful structures through which it takes a position of meaningful relevance in our
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perception. Hence, the aim of our investigation is to understand consumer goods as
ready-to-hand.
So far, we have been focusing on the perception of a single consumer good. But,
as we have shown before, in the phenomenological analysis of a single consumer good,
a whole set of referential equipment, a man-made world of equipment, also lights up
and demands our attention. What this points to is the notion that our
being-in-the-world rests upon perception of an entire world. Furthermore, the totality of
referential equipment reveals that being-in-the-world is only possible because of the
existence of a world (Heidegger 1927: 91). This is because without a world, namely a
whole set of referential equipment that forms the backdrop of any perception, there
could be no being-in-the-world. Hence, a key existential condition for
being-in-the-world, and therefore our interaction with consumer goods as a whole, is
worldliness. Worldliness, and its corresponding activity – dealing with equipment,
therefore forms our first discovery of an ontological structure that exists underneath our
perception of consumer good. Although, I will elaborate on this notion of worldliness
later with our treatment of Arendt. So, all in all, we have a working theory of the
structure of our perception when we interact with consumer goods. We exist as
being-in-the-world and consumer goods present themselves as a distribution of
meaningful equipment. The primary condition upon which our perception is so is the
condition of worldliness. Consuming goods is exemplary for the putting to use of the
tools and equipment set before us in the world to serve a particular end.
But such a theory seems to only offers us knowledge of what is meaningful based
upon the sole existential condition of worldliness. That we exist in this world, and that
the condition of our existence is that we exist with equipment. Consumer goods are
certainly equipment, and we could very well stop our existential phenomenology here
and be content with the answer that consumer goods are ready-to-hand and to be ‘put
to use to serve an end’. However, I would rather push our philosophy a bit further. To
serve what end? Do we consume in order to survive? Do we consume in order to be
social? Or how about in order to transcend mortality? We have yet to account for the
specific human motivations and drives in our analysis of consumer goods so far. So, to
develop a deeper appreciation of our relationship with consume goods, I propose
diversifying the range of existential human activities. We don’t just put things to use for
an end, we put things to use in order to survive, in order to create, in order to bond with
our fellow humans, in order to escape our limitations. Are these not existential
activities? Which in turn are actualizations of existential conditions? Don’t we get the
sense that we come into this world with a diversity of conditions that enable to us to do
a diversity of actions? Perhaps we should look for a more plural set of conditions upon
which the broad range of human activities can be thought of theoretically. This will
allow us to think of our activity of consumption more specifically, and it will allow us to
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move to a more nuanced perception of how we consume – rather than just the simplistic
understanding that it is ‘putting an object in the world to use for a particular end’.
Which in turn will allow us to dig deeper into those meaningful ontological structures
that underlie our perception and grasping of ready-to-hand consumer goods.
Not only are we looking for a diverse range of ontological structures, but also
structures that can be transformed with respect to changes in our environment or the
activities of other humans. We need structures that are responsive to human activity,
cultural activity and historical activity. This is because consumption patterns have
changed throughout history. The introduction of certain economic ideals, political
structures, and ideological beliefs have made their impact upon our relationship with
consumer goods. Which would imply that the ontological structures present in
consumer goods are dynamic. What we are therefore also looking for is a set of
existential conditions that are historically contingent, or at least, the process of the
actualization of these conditions are historically contingent. It is for these separate
reasons – of looking for a plural set of existential conditions that will allow us to zoom
in onto our relationship with consumer goods more specifically, and of looking for a set
of conditions that are historically contingent – that we move to Arendt’s fivefold
existential conditions.
Pluralizing our range of existential conditions – Arendt’s fivefold existential
conditions
In the Human Condition, Arendt draws a picture of five existential conditions
upon which being-in-the-world rests upon. Such conditions are life, worldliness,
plurality, natality and mortality (Arendt 1958: 7-10). Each condition forms the ground
upon which activity takes place (Loidolt 2017: 113). Further, each condition has a logic
to its actualization (Loidolt 2017: 113). Life is the condition of finding oneself in a body
(Arendt 1958: 7). It’s actualizing activity – labor – demands the seeking of survival,
shelter, water, food, etc. in accordance to one’s metabolic processes. (Arendt 1958: 7).
Moreover, labor also demands a participation in nature, as the source of human
sustenance is nature itself (Arendt 1958: 96). Because nature itself is cyclical – the change
of the seasons, the ripening and decaying of fruit, the decayed food re-entering the cycle
of life to provide for more food, etc. – labor too is oriented along this cyclical dimension
(Arendt 1958: 98). Eating, sleeping, procreation, excretion – all are bent in accordance to
a cyclical logic of release and renewal, exhaustion and pleasure (Arendt 1958: 98).
Worldliness is the condition of finding oneself in a totality of equipment (as a student of
Heidegger, Arendt did take from him). The condition of being brought into the human
artifice, a man-made landscape (Arendt 1958: 7). The logic of work – the actualization of
worldliness - is not only dealing with equipment but is also to create a world (Arendt
1958: 7). The aim is to create a world that is durable, to create structures and institutions
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that stand the test of time, such that humans can be at home in the great cosmos (Arendt
1958: 137). Plurality is the condition of finding oneself among other people (Arendt
1958: 7). Action is the activity which corresponds to plurality and is manifest in
dialogue and speech. The logic of action is to express individuality amongst a plural
setting (Arendt 1958: 178). To communicate in order to form a connection with our
fellow humans (Arendt 1958: 175). In this essay, the final two conditions have limited
reference to consumer goods, but for the sake of completeness they will be mentioned
here. Natality is the condition upon which we choose to bring forth things into the
world (Arendt 1958: 10). It is the condition that is the source of our effort to add to the
world, to our community and to bring about the new. Mortality is the condition upon
which our activities are motivated by the threat of death (Arendt 1958: 10). For Arendt,
these five conditions are revealed in our everyday experience as humans, in our
perception and in our engagement with our surroundings. Now our aim is to root our
relationship with consumer goods as an activation of one or more of these five
conditions. For this will allow us to speak of the ontological meaning behind
consumption. However, before we begin to do this, we must venture into the structure
of conditions and how they are actualized through activity.
Activities, Conditions, and Spaces of Meaning
Within our perception, consumption goods are ontologically rooted in a plurality
of spaces of meaning. However, before we get to spaces of meaning, let’s first
understand the relationship between conditions and activities. Activities guide our
behaviour, comportment and perception. Arendt’s 3 activities - labor, work and action -
are not ‘labels’ or ‘categories’ that singular events can be shelved under (Loidolt 2017:
111). They are experience-ordering. They reveal what is meaningful to us upon their
enactment (Loidolt 2017: 111). They are “ways of taking place” that unfold and spill
over into our everyday life (Loidolt 2017: 111), thereby tainting and coloring everything
that we see. So, eating, drinking, sleeping, these are not activities of labor, but rather are
activities through which we experience labor as a guide to our comportment. On the
other hand, conditions are “actualized” into activities (Loidolt 2017: 113). And in their
actualization, and the subsequent reflection of being-in-the-world, or ‘Dasein’, they are
revealed as fundamental structures that exist as antecedent to activity (Loidolt 2017:
113). So, for example, labor, as that activity that bends our experience towards
sustaining the biological process of the human body, is only shapes our experience
because of the fact that we are alive (Loidolt 2017: 113). If we were robots then we
would not be alive in the same way that we are, and there would be no need for labor as
an experience-ordering perspective. The activity cannot exist without its condition and
the condition cannot be revealed to us without its actualization into activity (Loidolt
2017: 113). For Arendt, the enactment of a condition directly results in the taking on of a
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hermeneutic perspective, in which entities appear rooted to ontological structures. The
hermeneutic perspectives that we take on as a result of doing labor, work and action are
animal laborans, homo faber and zoon politikon (Loidolt 2017: 114). Our surroundings
are subsequently morphed into a space of meaning whose inner rules are determined
by the specific hermeneutic perspective we take on (Loidolt 2017: 114). We do not just
embody one hermeneutic perspective at a time. Homo Faber needs food, Animal
Laborans uses tools (Loidolt 2017: 113). Meaning that these modes of existence,
hermeneutic perspectives, enactments of conditions are consistently folding into each
other (Loidolt 2017: 116). Their respective spaces of meaning, the ontological structures
that underlie our surroundings, also overlap and interpenetrate each other (Loidolt
2017: 116). Now that we are armed with a whole plethora of conditions and
hermeneutic perspectives, we can use these to develop an understanding of how we
perceive consumer goods. Upon first glance we already notice that depending upon the
consumer good we wish to analyze the distribution of the spaces of meaning present
changes. So for clothes and fashion, there is an element of survival in that some clothes
are necessary for protection against the weather, and therefore the labor space of
meaning is present, but there is also an element of expression, of showing that you are
different from others by wearing different clothes, and hence the action space of
meaning is also present. Furthermore, the consumption of non-necessary goods is in
itself an activity that does reveal an attribute of your individual persona, and hence it
must be constituted by either the action or work space of meaning. However, I would
maintain the consumption of necessary goods such as water, food, goods whole sole
purpose is to enter and sustain the life cycle, is constituted mainly by the labor space of
meaning. Although for the most part, we see that in our perception of consumer goods
there is a folding of several spaces of meaning into each other.
Dynamic Spaces of Meaning
Whilst our perception of consumer goods does contain a diverse set of spaces of
meaning, not all of these spaces of meaning are equal in how they constitute the entirety
of our horizon of experience. There are dominant spaces of meaning and they are
submissive spaces of meaning (Loidolt 2017: 118). Dominant spaces of meaning take up
much of the entirety of our horizon of experience and they are concomitant with the
domination of a particular kind of hermeneutic perspective (Loidolt 2017: 118). The
domination of a space of meaning is contingent upon certain historical events. Broadly
speaking, historical events are characterized with the introduction of new logics that
depart from prior logics of activity. This introduction therefore also changes what is
meaningful in the corresponding hermeneutic perspective and the space of meaning
itself. Subsequently, any activity that derives its purpose from that changed space of
meaning must change with respect to the new logic. If the new logic proves to be
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particularly successful by the metrics of a society, then the space of meaning will
expand and envelop much of the horizon of experience of the conscious subject. Hence,
in order to get a grasp at our experience with consumer goods, we must understand
which space of meaning is dominant in our perception of consumer goods and
understand how that space of meaning has grown to be dominant. We must, therefore,
embark on a project of building the history of ontological structures behind our current
perception of consumer goods.
The Rise of Homo Faber
In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt goes to great lengths to deliver a
historical overview of the dynamics of different spaces of meaning. We will examine
those dynamics that have a direct impact on our current perception of consumer goods.
In order to avoid recounting the whole of Arendt’s historical excursion, we will just
focus on the Renaissance era onwards. With that in mind, let us begin in the
Renaissance where the dominant space of meaning was the work space of meaning.
Some of the initial key figures that proposed this perspective were Galileo, Leonardo Da
Vinci, and Michelangelo. Galileo, in particular, had a huge role to play because of the
successes of his scientific experimental method (Arendt 1958: 295). He had shown that
via fabricating natural processes, in a controlled way, we can come to learn about what
nature is (Arendt 1958: 295). Nature can then be revealed via understanding its
processes (Arendt 1958: 295). This offered mankind an immense power over nature, and
this power became increasingly obvious such that more people began to trust in the
ideals of homo faber; namely, they began to trust in the vision that our surroundings are
constituted by processes (Arendt 1958: 296). The dominant space of meaning, therefore,
became that of work. Everything, all of nature, the human body itself, became a means,
a tool to be used. We see this most clearly in the mechanistic philosophies as promoted
by Hobbes and Descartes and in the introduction of biology to the scientific community
(Arendt 1958: 296-297). This attitude to which the people of the Renaissance and Early
Modern era brought to their shared horizon of experience could be encapsulated in this
quote from Immanuel Kant – “Give me matter and I can construct a world out of it”
(Arendt 1958: 296).
With the accumulation of wealth and technology, the world began to resemble
nature, therefore initiating the corruption of the work space of meaning by the logic of
labor. Upon the dawn of the industrial era, we see that mankind has complete trust in
the vision of homo faber. This resulted in mankind experiencing huge surpluses in
wealth and technology (Arendt 1958: 105). Furthermore, built in the logic of homo faber
was the expectation that the activity of world-building would only continue (Arendt
1958: 7). That the building of an economy would result in further growth of the
economy. That “money begets money” and “power begets power” (Arendt 1958: 105).
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As a consequence, the world - as the sum of wealth, technology, man-made equipment,
tools - was growing by an incredible rate. Homo faber became so successful in its
world-building mission that in the eyes of mankind, the size of the world began to
resemble the size of nature. Moreover, the incredible flow with which wealth and
technologies superseded each other resembled the great cyclical processes of nature
(Arendt 1958: 106). The growing abundance of necessary goods mirrored the fertility of
nature (Arendt 1958: 106). The growing number of goods also promoted further
consumption, and this promoted industries to create more goods (Arendt 1958: 133).
The cyclical nature of this consumption found its way into all industries and economies,
beginning with necessary goods like food, to all sorts of superfluities such as luxury
goods (Arendt 1958: 133). Hence, more and more, what were originally products of
work, slowly became products for consumption. What we are beginning to see is how
the previously dominant space of meaning – that of work - is being dominated by the
labor space of meaning. The logic of labor slowly spills into the work space of meaning
as processes became faster and more repetitive, thereby approximating the logic of
exhaustion and regeneration. This logic found its way into the work space of meaning
because the boundaries between world and nature began to crumble as the world grew
in size and grew to resemble nature. We slowly began to see the world through the eyes
of animal laborans, as something that is to be incorporated in great cyclical processes.
The Victory of Animal Laborans
Due to the emphasis on production the labor space of meaning becomes
dominant. During the industrial era, production became an ideal (Arendt 1958: 307). In
order to sustain the abundance of consumer goods and economic success, production in
the workplace needed to be stressed. This had the effect of moving the value in a
produced good from what it is essentially, to what it could be used for to produce more
(Arendt 1958: 308). Shifting this value subsequently contributed to the deterioration of
the world, for if there was no value to be found in possible permanent, durable features
of the world, then there is no necessity to keep them (Arendt 1958: 309). Instead, their
value stems from what they can be used for, which essentially made them valueless in
themselves (Arendt 1958: 309). The valuelessness of the world, as the sum of valueless
producer goods, therefore, demoted the work space of meaning as subservient. This
contributed to the fall of homo faber. Furthermore, In the modern era’s manic pursuit of
‘productivity’ certain production efficiencies were introduced. Such as the Division of
Labor, which was essentially to divide the production process into multiple
departments such that unskilled workers can participate in the workforce, thereby
heightening the number of people working at once, and shortening the duration and
cost for product creation. In doing this, the ideals of homo faber were undermined as
the goods created were not the product of skilled workmanship (Arendt 1958: 123).
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There was no record of the individual inside these products (Arendt 1958: 123). Rather,
the meaning behind these goods was derived from the labor space of meaning. These
goods are meant to be consumed at a rapid pace, there were not meant to be durable
entities that stand the test of time (Arendt 1958: 125). So, we also get the broadening of
the label ‘consumer good’ to not only include goods to be literally consumed but also
‘goods’ that used to be products of work such as ‘chairs, tables, houses, etc.’ As homo
faber fell, animal laborans rose.
The promotion of the principle of happiness and the introduction of new life
philosophies further cemented the dominance of animal laborans. As consumer goods
became more abundant, the pleasure of consumption became more accessible (Arendt
1958: 108). This combined with the reduction of pain and effort in the production
process resulted in the promotion of the principle of happiness (Arendt 1958: 108).
“Happiness became concomitant with labor itself”, which cemented the logic of life as
this was the kind of happiness found in surplus consumption and limited labor (Arendt
1958: 108). This notion of happiness became so overwhelming that philosophers such as
Jeremy Bentham had founded whole philosophical systems, like utilitarianism and the
principle of the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, to it
(Arendt 1958: 309). Our experience is now bent towards the notion of procuring
economic progress and consumer good abundance. Such that we can continue to
consume and to be happy in our repetitive consumption. In addition to this, there were
a number of philosophies and scientific discoveries that seemed to also promote the
purpose of human existence as sustaining the life process such as Darwin’s evolutionary
theory and Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ (Arendt 1958: 116-117). The deterioration of the
world, the focus on productivity and abundance, the expectation of happiness upon
consumption, and the rational ground upon which labor can be said to be the purpose
of human existence provided by thinkers such as Darwin and Nietzsche, all combined
to promote the hermeneutic perspective of animal laborans over all. Consequently, our
society today seems to be oriented around the logic of “securing the necessities of life,
providing for their abundance”, and the seeking of happiness in consumption. To sum
up, our comportment towards consumer goods today derives its orientation from the
labor space of meaning. Consumer goods are seen to be entities that can not only
provide sustenance but also provide happiness, a release from exhaustion. Further, they
are seen to be highly abundant to the point where they resemble the fertility of nature,
and hence our awareness of the limited resources used in their creation is itself very
limited. Moreover, by the domination of the labor space of meaning over the work space
of meaning, products of work that were meant to be worldly “lose their character and
become more and more objects of consumption”. For people in this consumer society,
the whole world, no longer viewed from the perspective of homo faber, becomes a
consumer good (Arendt 1958: 132).
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Conclusion
All in all, the philosophies of both Heidegger, who gave us the methodology of
understanding consumption goods through perceiving it only as ready-to-hand, and
Arendt, who provided us with a historical overview of the hermeneutic perspectives we
take with respect to consumer goods, have provided us with a rough picture of the
hidden ontological structures underneath our perception of consumer goods. The
plurality of these ontological structures, spaces of meaning, have allowed us to diversify
the range of reasons why consumption is meaningful. And, the tracing of the history of
these plural spaces of meaning has shown us why our current perception of consumer
goods is more or less constituted only by the labor space of meaning. Of course, that is
not to say that there is no element of the work and action space of meaning present in
our perception of consumer goods, only that the labor space of meaning has grown to
be the most dominant. With this in mind, it is important to stress that our Arendtian
approach to a phenomenology of consumer goods is far from finished. We have yet to
dig into the history of the action, natality and mortality spaces of meaning with respect
to consumption. How is the consumption of a good an expression of our individuality?
Is repetitive consumption of goods effectively silencing our ability to act? Furthermore,
there is a vast multitude of historical events that have spanned the time since Arendt
wrote the Human Condition and I began writing this report, all of which had an effect
on the logic of all spaces of meaning. The fall of competing economic systems such as
that of the USSR, the introduction of e-commerce and fast fashion, the increasing
immateriality of consumer products such as music streaming and online subscriptions,
the pressures of climate change and environmental degradation to cease consumption
altogether – all alter the spaces of meaning present in our perception of consumption
goods. A phenomenology of consumer goods for today would account for these
historical shifts. Whilst this paper does show how the phenomenological methodologies
of Heidegger and Arendt are extremely relevant at getting behind the meaning of
consumption, it is still incomplete in that it does not offer us a complete breadth of
analysis of all existential conditions, nor does it offer a complete history of the dynamics
of all relevant spaces of meaning. Although, future projects in the phenomenology of
consumer goods may now depart from this point.
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